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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR CONSUMERS AND 
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
Eugene M. Anderson, Jr. * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SocIetIes have long struggled with the problems ansmg when 
a debtor can no longer payor perform hIS obligatIon. SolutIons 
range from the penodic debt forgIveness, of anCIent HebraIC SOCI­
ety 1 to the Impnsonment of the debtor for failure to pay of recent 
Anglo-Amencan Junsprudence. 2 ASIde from moral consIderatIons, 
both of these alternatIves are unthmkable m modem socIety where 
credit plays an Important role. Such chOices excessIvely chill the 
use of credit on opposite SIdes of the debtor-creditor relatIonshIp. 
To foster credit usage,3 it IS necessary to at least offer the debtor a 
new opportunity m life and a clear field for future effort."4 At the 
same tIme, creditors must be gtven some assurance of equality of 
Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., 
WashIngton and Lee UnIversity, 1952; J.D., Duke UnIversity, 1954; LL.M., UnIver­
sity of VirgInIa, 1970. 
1. At the end of every seven years thou shalt make release. And thIS 's 
the manner of the release: every creditor who lendeth anythmg unto hIS 
neIghbor, shall release it; he shall not exact it of hIS neIghbor, or of hIS 
brother, because it IS called the Lord' release. 
Deuteronomy 15:1 (King James). 
Not all of the ancIent world was so debtor onented. The Roman Laws of the 
Twelve Tables allowed creditor to take delinquent debtor, 
and either tie hIm by the neck, or put Irons upon hIS feet, proVIded the 
chaIn does not weIgh above fifteen pounds. If the debtor be Insolvent to 
several creditors, let hIS body be cut In pIeces on the thIrd marketday. It 
may be cut Into more or fewer pIeces with Impunity· Or, if hIS creditors 
consent to it, let hIm be sold to foreIgners beyond the Tiber. 
T. COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 658 (1812). 
2. The fate of these unfortunates IS described by Mr. Justice Hyde: 
If man be taken In execution and lie In pnson for debt, neither the plaIn­
tiff at whose suit he IS arrested, nor the sheriff who took hIm, IS bound to 
find hIm meat, dnnk, or clothes; but he must live on hIS own, or on the 
charity of others: and if no man will relieve hIm, let hIm die In the name of 
God, says the law' and so say I. 
Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex. 1663). 
3. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1973) [hereInafter 
cited as Comm. Report]. 
4. Local Loan Co. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, (1933). 
5 
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treatment withm theIr category of creditors. Congress, under a 
ConstitutIonal grant of authority 5 has gradually developed a solu­
tIon to the problem of the msolvent debtor WhICh leaves the 
debtor-creditor relatIonshIp structurally unchanged, but substan­
tIally alters from ongmal expectatIons the method and substance of 
the satIsfactIOn of the debtor s obligatIOn. 
Two wIdely diffenng general solutions to the problem of bank­
ruptcy have evolved under the statutory scheme. The first, the 
chapter proceeding, attempts to rehabilitate the debtor who pays 
all, or much, of the debt. The other, the liqUIdatIon proceeding, 
protects creditor nghts to the extent possible while gIVmg the 
debtor a fresh start. In a liqUIdatIon proceeding, the court 
marshalls and liqUIdates the debtor s assets, and applies the re­
sulting funds toward the debts. Subsequent JudicIally enforced col­
lectIOn of the debts from the debtor personally IS barred. 
Through hIStOry the pnmary attentIon of bankruptcy law has 
been on busmess bankruptcIes. Consumer credit IS a recent phe­
nomenon. The draftsmen of the Bankruptcy CommISSIOn proposed 
far-reachmg, radical legIslatIve changes m attemptmg to deal with 
the problems of the bankrupt consumerS and consumer creditors. 
Only some of these proposed changes survIved the enactment 
process. 7 ThIS artIcle exammes the more sIgnificant substantIve 
changes8 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (the BRA or new Act) 
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cI. 4. 
6. H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), repnnted In [1978] 5 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 5964-66 [heremafter cited as House Report]. 
"Consumers will be used m thIS article to describe mdivlduals whose debts or 
claIms m bankruptcy are defined m the new Bankruptcy Act as follows: consumer 
debt" means debt mcurred by an mdivldual pnmarily for personal family or house­
hold purpose. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Supp. 1979) [heremafter referred to as 
BRA]. Cf U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (definmg consumer goods m secured transactions). 
It IS typIcal of the BRA that its emphaSIS IS on consumer debtors, that IS, bank­
rupts rather than consumer creditors who have claIms agamst debtors. "Debtors 
IS the term used m the BRA to describe the entity whICh would formerly be called 
bankrupt. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West Supp. 1979); cf Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 
U.S.C. § 1(4) (1976) (repealed 1979). ThIS article will frequently follow the old termI­
nology of "bankrupt, the new termmology IS far too ImprecIse. Debtor has many 
more generally accepted meanIngs m addition to the new legIslative definition. It IS 
unfortunately far from atypIcal of the termmology of the BRA whICh all too often 
does not make use of words with well known and specific meanmgs m bankruptcy 
law that substitutes mstead termmology with general, ImprecIse meanmg. Alto­
gether, the BRA IS extremely difficult to follow as comprehensible pIece of writing. 
For an excellent, although mcomplete, summary of the hIstory of the BRA 
see Frost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform, cIrca 1977 33 Bus. LAw 489 
(1978). For subsequent developments see 9 BANKR. SERV (L. ED.) 1-97 (1979). 
8. While the line between substance and procedure IS not always clear, the sIg­
nificant procedural changes for consumers deserve separate treatment. For example, 
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that prmclpally Impact on the mdivldual with debts or claIms 
mcurred pnmarily for personal, family or household purposes m a 
liqUidation proceeding. 
One commentator has stated that the liqUidation bankruptcy 
proceeding offers the bankrupt an opportunity to retaIn exempt" 
property and, more Importantly to obtaIn the bankruptcy dis­
charge. 9 The Bankruptcy Reform Act deals with both of these ob­
jectives m significant ways. 
II. EXEMPTIONS 
It became generally accepted durIng the nIneteenth century 
that certaIn property belongmg to Individuals should not be subject 
to levy under Judicial process. 10 This same policy was perceived to 
apply to bankruptcy Consequently each of the federal bankruptcy 
acts has provided that some property of the bankrupt not be liqUi­
dated, but be set aSide for the bankrupt's use.ll Under the Bank­
ruptcy Act of 1898, the trustee did not take title to the bankrupt's 
exempt property 12 DetermmatIon of exempt status was by the ex­
emption from legal process law of the bankrupt's state of domi­
cile. 13 Since the admInistratIOn of exempt property was not withIn 
the trustee s powers, bankruptcy proceedings became a confused 
struggle between claImants with state-recognized nghts In exempt 
property trustees with federal Bankruptcy Act nghts, and bank­
rupts themselves. 14 The reference to state law for exemptions pro-
the United States trustee system, and the reform of Chapter XIII, wage earner s 
plans, to the new Chapter 13, mdivlduals with regular IOcome plans will not be dis­
cussed 10 thiS article. 
9. Countryman, Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Pro­
posals. 19 U. KAN. L. REV 165, 167-68 (1971). 
10. Kennedy, LImitation of Exemptions In Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REv 445, 
446 (1960). Professor Kennedy traces the development of exemption by the courts. 
11. An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United 
States, Ch. XIX, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed by An Act to repeal an act, entitled An 
act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, Ch. 
VI, 2 Stat. 248 (1803)); An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy through­
out the United States, Ch. IX, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed by An Act to repeal the 
bankrupt [SIc] act, Ch. LXXXII, 5 Stat. 614 (1843)). Each of these Acts prOVided ex­
emptions 10 the statute. An Act to establish uniform system of bankruptcy through­
out the United States, Ch. CLXXVI, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed by An Act to repeal 
the bankrupt [SIC] law, Ch. 160. 20 Stat. 99 (1878)). ThiS Act employed federal ex­
emptions as minImUm, and adopted the exemptions of the state of domlcile of the 
bankrupt as an alternative. 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 70(a)(1976)(repealed 1979). 
13. Id. § 6. 
14. Countryman, For New Exemption Policy In Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. 
REV 678 (1960); see Kennedy supra note 10, at 453. 
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duced extreme vanatIons In the value of property retamed by a 
bankrupt In bankruptcy 15 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Improves and clarifies 
substantially the method of dealing with exempt property Title to 
all legal or equitable Interests of the bankrupt In property passes to 
the trustee. 16 The bankrupt then requests exemption of qualified 
property17 by filing a list of that property with the trustee. Unless 
objected to by a party m Interest, the trustee will exempt the prop­
erty on the bankrupt's list. 18 Property whIch would otherwise qual­
ify as exempt, but whICh IS subject to a JudiCIal lien, may be 
claImed as exempt and the bankrupt may aVOid the lien to the ex­
tent that the property IS exempted. Similarly where exempt 
household and personal goods are subject to non-purchase money 
security Interests, the security mterest can be aVOIded. 19 Where 
property otherwIse exempted has been Involuntarily transferred 
and not concealed, the bankrupt or the trustee may aVOid the 
transfer and claIm the property Where the trustee has exercIsed 
these aVOiding powers, the property may be exempted and clrumed 
by the bankrupt. 20 WaIvers of exemption are unenforceable. 21 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act also changes the method of 
determInIng what property may be exempted. The ongmal Bank­
ruptcy CommISSIOn Bill22 sets out a list of allowable federal exemp­
tIons23 whICh was to be the exclUSIve itemIzation of what could be 
15. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 167 Professor Countryman uses some 
dramatic hypothetical examples whICh illustrate these extremes. 
16. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West Supp. 1979). 

17 Id. § 552(e). 

18. Id. 
19. Id. § 522(f). The constitutionality of thiS provISIon may be questioned. 
20. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(g)-(j) (West Supp. 1979). The language of these subsec­
tions IS obscure. It apparently denves from prOVISIOn m the CommiSSIOn bill whICh 
prOVided m clear language that" [nlo property recovered under prOVISIOns of thiS Act 
shall be allowed as exempt if the property recovered was concealed or voluntarily 
transferred by the debtor, unless so transferred to secure debt and then only to the 
extent the value of the property exceeds the debt. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 
125. It IS difficult to see much practical application to the enacted versIOn smce most 
of the situations to whICh it would apply mvolve JudiCial liens covered m and pro­
Vided by § 522(f)(1). 
21. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West Supp. 1979). Although much mk has been 
spilled on the subject, waivers of exemption were valid under state law III very few 
mstances. 
22. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 125-27 
23. Id. at 125. The report states: 
The reference to nonbankruptcy law to detennille the exemptions IS 
abandoned to elimmate diversity reduce the amount of litigation havmg no 
direct relationship to the policy underlymg exemptions, and because state 
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exempted. Many cribcs doubted the ability of a unified, federal 
system of exemptions to account for varymg conditions and SOC1al 
v1ewpomts of the whole country 24 As enacted, the Bankruptcy Re­
form Act allows the bankrupt to choose either the federal exemp­
tion plan or the exemption scheme of h1s state of domICile. 25 The 
result of th1s 1S to make the federal exemption the floor or bas1c ex­
emption. Th1s will compel lawyers for bankrupts to determme total 
allowable exemptions under both the federal and state schemes to 
Judge whICh plan 1S larger unless the state provISIOns are extremely 
generous or mggardly Where federal exemptions are markedly 
more generous, the Act encourages voluntary bankruptcy to pro­
tect the property whICh otherwIse would be subject to execution 
and levy under Judgments m state law 26 
III. DISCHARGE: NEW CONCEPTS TO PROTECT 

ITS EFFECTIVENESS 

If exemptions g1ve the debtor some mm1mum property with 
whICh to begm h1s fresh start, discharge 1S mtended to gIVe h1m 
that fresh start. For a var1ety of reasons, however, a debtor 1S often 
moved to reaffirm debts whICh would be discharged m a bank­
ruptcy proceeding. Th1s reaffirmation of debts whICh 1S then en­
forceable27 senously undercuts the effectiveness of discharge. 
exemption laws seem generally archaIc and unduly generous In some states 
and exceedingly mggardly, particularly as to urban resIdents, In others. 
ld. The policy of the first two bankruptcy acts was followed. 
24. See note 10 supra and accompanYIng text. 
25. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West Supp. 1979). 
26. One apparent weakness In the federal exemptions IS that, follOWIng the 
modem trend In such statutes, the exemptions are expressed In dollar amounts 
whIch, it IS supposed, will provIde for flexibility In the present vaned, largely urban, 
socIety But these dollar amounts are absolute and become qUIckly out of date In pe­
nods of hIgh Inflation. The CommIssIOn Bill § 1-105 recogmzed thIS and prOVIded 
that the amounts should be adjusted every two years by formula based on the Con­
sumer Pnce Index. BRA § 104, reflecting senes of political compromIses, prOVIdes 
for adjustments to be recommended by the JudicIal Conference every SIX years with 
no standards gIven. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West Supp. 1979). ThIS scheme will shortly 
have the exemptions essentially worthless In perIod of double digit Inflation. See, 
95 CONGo REC. Hll,049 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). 
27. The legal baSIS for the enforcement of such reaffirmed debts IS expressed 
by the New York Court of Appeals as follows: "[t]he debt IS not paId by the dis­
charge m bankruptcy. It IS due m consCIence, although discharged m law and thIS 
moral obligation, uniting with the subsequent promIse to pay, creates nght of ac­
tion. Herrmgton Davitt, 220 N.Y. 162, 167, 115 N.E. 476,477 (1917). For an out­
standing study of thIS tOPIC see Boshkoff, The Bankrupt' Moral Obligation to Pay 
His Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 
47 IND. L.J. 36 (1971). See also lA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 17.33, at 1753 (14th 
ed. 1971) [heremafter cited as Collier]. 
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While some bankrupts may feel that they should reaffirm 
those debts they can pay payment may always be made without 
reaffirmation. The fact that the vast majority of bankruptcIes are 
voluntary28 suggests that most petitioners seek discharge relief. 
Thus, reaffirmation may not be motivated so much by a feeling of 
moral obligation as by some form of direct or mdirect creditor 
pressure. 
The 1970 amendments29 to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 have 
been cited as allevIating thIS problem. 30 TheIr effectIveness, how­
ever IS limited. 31 The pertment amendments provIded for a deter 
mmatIon m bankruptcy court of the dischargeability of certam 
debts, and prohibited use of any "action or "process" to collect 
debts that are determmed discharged. ThIs left a large range of 
creditor action available, mcluding overt harassment. If the cred­
itor could persuade the debtor to make a new promIse after dis­
charge, thIs promIse would be enforceable. 32 
A number of situations whICh are particularly sensitive to cred­
itor pressure have been Identified and are dealt with m the new 
Act. For example, a lender may hold a security mterest m exempt 
household and personal goods of the debtor Such goods were sub­
Ject to reposseSSIon by the lender after bankruptcy under the old 
Act. When the replacement cost of such goods was hIgh, even 
though theIr value was low m companson with the debt owed, the 
28. In 1976 voluntary liqUidation bankruptcies totaled 207,926; mvoluntary liq­
Uidation bankruptices, 1,141. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 14 (1978). These figures are rep­
resentative of recent years. 
29. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-466, 84 Stat. 990. 
30. Twmem, Bankruptcy Report: Some LImitations on Creditors Rights, 29 
Bus. LAw 353,364 (1974). 
31. See House Report, supra note 6, at 163, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124. 
32. The BRA recogmzes the distinction between legal action or other acts 
aimed at mducmg the debtor to pay discharged debt and the legal reaffirmation of 
the debt glvmg nse to new legal cause of action. The BRA not only enJoms "[c]om­
mencement or continuation of any action, the employment of process but also, any 
act, to collect any [discharged] debt as personal liability of the debtor 
11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979) The House Report pomts out that thiS IS 
an expansIOn of the old Act to cover "[a]ny act to collect, such as dunnmg by tele­
phone or letter, or mdirectly through fnends, relatives, or employers, harassment, 
threats of reposseSSIOn, and the like. House Report, supra note 6, at 366 repnnted 
In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6321-22. The Report agreed that 
"[t]he change IS consonant with the new policy forbidding bmding reaffirmation 
agreements but it IS not the same thmg and only has the same goal "to msure 
that once debt IS discharged, the debtor will not be pressured m any way to repay 
it. ld. 
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debtor was frequently mduced to reaffirm the entire debt rather 
than lose hIs property 33 
The BRA deals with thIs problem m two ways m additIon to 
the antIreaffirmatIon prOVISIon. Under subsectIon 522(£)(2),34 a 
nonpurchase money security mterest m exempt household goods 
may be aVOided by the debtor Secondly under sectIon 722, tangI­
ble personal property mtended pnmarily for personal, family or 
household use, whICh IS exempted or abandoned by the trustee as 
bemg of mconsequentIal value to the estate, may be redeemed by 
the debtor from a lien secunng a dischargeable consumer debt. 
Operation of thIs redemptIon prOVlSlon reqmres valuatIon of the 
collateral and the estate s mterest m it to determme the extent of 
the secured clrum under the BRA sectIon 506. 35 The secured claIm 
of the creditor may not exceed the valuation of the estate s mterest 
m the collateral. Any excess of the clrum that remruns IS regarded 
as an unsecured clrum. The debtor may redeem the collateral prop­
erty by paymg the holder of the lien the amount of the secured 
claIm allowed. 36 The concept of a secured creditor IS Irrelevant. 
Where the amount of the security mterest IS equal to the valuatIon 
of the collateral, or the amount of the security mterest and the 
available exemptIon are equal to the collateral valuatIon, the debtor 
SImply pays the amount of the security mterest to the secured 
party and redeems the collateral.37 
33. Even though the debt mIght be discharged, the lien or security mterest was 
not so discharged, and to the extent not aVOIded, could be enforced agamst both the 
exempt and nonexempt property of the debtor. 
34. See text accompanymg note 19 supra. 
35. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West Supp. 1979). The House Report, commenting on 
the valuation prOVISIOn of thIS section explamed: 'Value does not necessarily con­
template forced sale or liqUIdation value of the collateral; nor does it always Imply 
full gomg concern value. Courts will have to determme value on case-by-case ba­
SIS, takmg mto account the facts of each case and competing mterests m the case. 
House Report supra, note 6, at 356, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5963, 6311-12. See also S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), re­
pnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787 5854. The Senate Bill 
would not have adopted thIS standard but would have reqUIred the reclalmmg debtor 
to pay "fau value. S. 2266, 95th Congo 1st Sess. (1978). T the effect that "fau 
value was used mtentionally, see S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1978). 
The enacted verSIOn would seem to make possible squeezmg of the secured cred­
itor. 
36. 11 U.S.C.A. § 722 (West Supp. 1979). 
37 Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-504, at 130 n.2. It IS mteresting to specu­
late that, even if not eligible for exemption, such consumer goods collateral fully 
subject to security mterest may and perhaps should, be abandoned by the Trustee 
under § 554 as of mconsequential value to the estate, thereby makmg it eligible for 
redemption under § 722. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 722 (West Supp. 1979). 
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Where the total exemption amount allowed together with the 
amount of the secured claIm IS not as great as the valuation as­
SIgned the collateral, the analYSIS IS less clear. Assume that the col­
lateral IS an automobile valued at $2,500 and there IS a secured bal­
ance owmg on the purchase pnce of $1,200. The debtor may 
exempt an additional $1,200, leavmg an mterest m the estate of 
$100. May the trustee force a sale of the vehICle and force the 
debtor to replace it at a hIgher pnce? While it IS true that the 
valuation could take care of thIS problem, replacmg a car almost al­
ways costs more than appraIsers will allow on an eXIstmg one. It IS 
also true that the secured party has no leverage to force reaffirma­
tion m thIS situation, but surely the redemption prOVlSlon has a 
broader reach than thIS.38 
Another example of a reason why debtors may reaffirm a 
dischargeable debt IS to obtam a new loan from a pnor lender who 
would, were it not for the reaffirmation, have collection of the 
earlier debt barred. The House Report expressed hope that such 
pressure to obtam new money Immediately after bankruptcy would 
be alleViated by the new federal exemption floor prOVIded m the 
BRA section 522.39 ThIS hope IS of doubtful validity 
38. See Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 276. The Committee Report uses the 
follow1Og example: 
[T]he debtor owned $2,000 car, subject to $1,200 lien, the debtor could 
exempt hiS $800 10terest 10 the car. The debtor IS permitted $1,500 exemp­
tion 10 car, [$1,200 10 the Act as passed.] ThiS section permits him to 
pay the holder of the lien $1,200 and redeem the entire car, not Just the re­
ma1010g $700 of hiS exemption. The redemption IS accomplished by paY10g 
the holder of the lien the amount of the allowed claim secured by the lien. 
The proVISIOn amounts to nght of first refusal for the debtor 10 consumer 
goods that might otherwise be repossessed. The nght of redemption under 
thiS section IS not walvable. 
House Report, supra note 6, at 381, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. 
NEWS 5963, 6337. The Bankruptcy CommissIOn would not have given any broader 
effect to its predecessor version of § 722. The CommissIOn po1Oted out that the 
debtor may purchase at the trustee sale, whICh it apparently felt was suffiCient pro­
tection. Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 1130. 
39. House Report, supra note 6, at 163, repnnted Itl [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6124. An mteresting contrast 10 comments on these generally 
agreed reasons for reaffirmation may be seen 10 the House Report whICh may be 
charactenzed on thiS pomt as writing from the perspective of the debtor and Mr. 
Twmem. See note 30 supra at 365. Mr. Tw10em makes fasc10ating argument from 
creditor viewpomt. Pomting out that the debtor IS not unlikely to need cash and IS 
willing to enter mto new transaction covenng both the old debt and new loan to 
get it, he concludes: 
ThiS IS practical consideration. If the old debt could not be affirmed, 
lender could not advance additional cash on new loan without cancelling 
the pnor loan. If he did not cancel, the borrower would be mdebted on two 
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One of the greatest areas of abuse anses out of the fact that if 
a debtor gIves a false or mcomplete financIal statement to obtam a 
loan, that debt may be exempt from discharge. 40 While m some 
cases the debtor IS deliberately unfaithful, conSIderable eVidence 
eXists that some unscrupulous lenders encourage falsification to 
protect theIr mterest from discharge m a bankruptcy proceeding. 41 
Such eVIdence led to the 1970 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 prOVIding that the creditor who contended hIS debt was 
nondischargeable for falsification must have the dischargeability de­
termmed by the bankruptcy court. 42 
The House Committee concluded that, despite the amend­
ment, some creditors mIght threaten to have the debt excepted 
from discharge and force the debtor to choose between paymg the 
costs of litIgatIon to determme dischargeability (or perhaps havmg 
hIS discharge held up for one disputed debt), and settling the claIm 
by reaffirmmg all or part of the debt. 43 The CommISSIOn Bill re­
solved the problem of creditor encouraged falsificatIon by elimI­
natmg the exceptIon from discharge where the debt m questIon 
was a consumer debt. 44 ThIS change was met with predictable op­
contracts of loan at the same time In VIOlation of the Small Loan Laws. Un­
less cancelled the old loan must be paId off by the proceeds from the new 
loan. 
TWInem, supra note 30, at 365. It IS hard to see how thiS could prevail agaInst bank­
ruptcy policy Both the Senate and House Reports conclude, "In effect, the discharge ex­
tingUishes the debt S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978), reprinted In 
[1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865-67. House Report supra note 6, 
at 365, reprinted In [1978) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 5963, 6320-21. Sec­
tion 366 deals with the special situation of utility servICe. 11 U.S.C.A. § 366 (West 
Supp. 1979). While much of the applicability of the section IS to trustee continuIng 
bUSIness under Chapter proceedings, by its tenns the section also applies to debt­
ors (bankrupts) and prohibits utility from a1tenng, refUSIng or discontinuIng service, 
or discnmInation agaInst debtor. ld. The legislative history of the section Indicates 
that utility means one whICh has monopoly supplier position. House Report, supra 
note 6, at 350, reprinted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 5963, 6306. The 
debtor must furnish adequate assurance of payment of past bankruptcy debts withIn 
20 days of the begInnIng of the bankruptcy. The obvIOUS Implication of the section IS 
that non-utility suppliers can refuse to deal with debtor-bankrupt, so the pressure 
for reaffinnation may still be great. 
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). 
41. See House Report, supra note 6, at 163, reprinted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124. 
42. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 17c(3) (1976) (repealed 1979); lA Col­
lier, supra note 27, ~ 17,28A, at 1725; Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 306. 
43. House Report, supra note 6, at 163-64, reprinted In (1978) 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6124. 
44. Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-506(a)(2), at 136 n.2. 
14 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:5 
posihon45 and was not mcluded m the Bankruptcy Judges Bi1l46 or 
the BRA subsectIon 523(a)(2). 
Under the BRA, a creditor who loses a bId to have a consumer 
debt found nondischargeable for bemg mduced by a false financIal 
statement must pay the costs and attorneys fees mcurred by the 
debtor m opposmg the creditor 47 ThIS removes the concern of the 
honest debtor willing to submit to litIgatIOn over costs of that litIga­
hon msofar as those costs were a factor m mducmg reaffirmatIon. 
Monetary costs, however, may not be the major factor for reaffir 
matIon. The tIme lost and the delay m the proceedings may be of 
equal or greater sIgnificance to the debtor 48 
As a last example of reasons for reaffirmatIon, when an obliga­
tion IS co-sIgned by a fnend or a relatIve of the debtor the debtor 
may reaffirm to protect the co-obligor from bemg reqUired to pay 
the obligation. While the new Act offers a solutIon m Chapter 13 
cases, it IS plam that thIS leverage will contmue to encourage reaf­
firmation m liqUidatIon proceedings. 49 
The Bankruptcy CommISSIOn felt that the frustration of the 
"fresh start" goal by reaffirmatIon of debts was senous enough to 
deserve elimmatIon by an absolute prohibition agamst reaffirm a­
45. See, e.g., note 30 supra, at 363. 
46. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 95(b)(2) (1975). 

47 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(d) (West Supp. 1979). 

48. The Bankruptcy CommIssIOn Report concluded: 
One of the more troublesome exceptions to discharge under the present Act 
IS the nondischargeability of consumer debt obtamed by the use of false 
financIal statement. Substantial eVIdence of the abuse of thIS exception by 
creditors has come to the attention of the CommISSIon. The exception has 
also generated substantial amount of litigation and has partially frustrated 
the "fresh start" goal of the discharge. On balance, the abuses and the harm­
ful effects far outweIgh the benefit to creditors by thIS exception. No eVI­
dence has come to the CommIssIOn attention that mdicates the exception 
has any prophylactic effect. 
Comm. Report supra note 3, at 176 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, some 
creditors saw it differently· 
[Debtors] were apprehenSIve that if they gave truthful statement, the 
credit would be demed. When confronted with the false finanCIal state­
ment either directly or often through theIr attorney, they realize theIr wrong­
domg and are willing to reaffirm theIr obligation. In other cases, the attor­
ney for the lender and the bankrupt' attorney will conclude that it IS likely 
that the lender will prevail m case of suit (now on Nondischargeable Ap­
plication), and so they will agree on terms of settlement. 
Twmem, supra note 30, at 364. 
49. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West Supp. 1979) prOVIdes for stay of action agamst 
nonprofeSSIOnal co-debtor of consumer debtor, but BRA § 524(e) makes plam that 
such relief does not apply m liqUIdation. 
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tIon. 50 Hence, Bill 8200 had a sImilar prohibition; however, reaf­
firmatIon m a settlement of a proceeding to determme the 
discharge ability of the reaffirmed debt and reaffirmatIOn m a re­
demptIon agreement were vIewed as desIrable exceptIons to the 
prohibitIon. 51 It was apparently felt that the controls and limita­
tIOns placed by the new proposals on these motIvatIons for reaffir 
matIon were sufficIent to obvIate the burden whICh mIght be 
placed on the "fresh start. 
The BRA subsectIons 524(c) and (d) further retreat from the 
CommISSIOn S recommendatIOn of complete prohibitIon. Reaffirma­
tIon agreements are permitted, but agreement must be entered 
mto before discharge and must be followed by a thIrty day 
cooling-off" penod after the agreement would otherwIse become 
enforceable dunng whICh tIme the debtor may rescmd hIS reaffir 
matIon. 52 
If the debtor IS an mdividual, before the reaffirmation IS al­
lowed, the court must gIve advIce about its effect and the lack of 
legal reqUIrement for it. Furthermore, if reaffirmatIon of a con­
sumer debt53 not secured by real property IS at Issue, the court 
must find that it will not Impose undue hardshIps on the debtor or 
defendants and IS m the debtor s best mterests. On the other hand, 
if the reaffirmation IS part of a settlement of false finanCIal state­
ment litIgation or IS part of a redemptIon agreement, the court IS 
reqUIred to find only that the settlement or agreement has been 
entered mto m good faith. 
SO. Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-S07(a), at 142. Although the section con­
tams cross-references to §§ 4-504(b) and 4-S06(b) whICh might be thought exceptions, 
note to that Section explams: 
Neither section upholds the reaffinnation of an extingUished debt. Section 
4-504(b) pennits the enforcement of an agreement whICh m effect enables 
the debtor to purchase collateral secunng dischargeable consumer debt. 
Section 4-506(b) allows, with safeguards protecting the debtor, the enforce­
ment of an agreement settling whether or not debt IS dischargeable. 
Comm. Report, supra note 3, at 143 n.2. 
51. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 524(b)-(c) (1978), House Report supra 
note 6, at 366, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6321-22. 
In fact, both of these exceptions were part of the CommisSIOn proposals despite the 
denIal of their exceptional result. See note 23, s.upra. The language of the Senate Bill 
was Identical, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978), but was subsequently amended. 
95th CONGo REc. H11,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). 
52. It IS mteresting to note that creditor advocate proposed consumer 
cooling-off penod of 48 hours Similar to the nght to disaffirm contract entered mto 
at [the consumer s] place of reSidence through door-to-door salesman. Twmem, 
supra note 30, at 366. 
53. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Supp. 1979). 
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ThIS does not seem sound. There may be good reason to allow 
reaffirmatIon agreements under supervIsIon of the court m the set­
tlement of false statement litIgatIon and redemptIOns, but the hard­
shIp and best mterest standards, rather than a nebulous good 
faith" standard, should be Imposed here where they have meamng 
relatIve to the Issues bemg litIgated. 54 HardshIp and best mterest 
standards, when applied to other reaffirmatIons, are subjectIve and 
largely depend on the moral chOices and viewpomts of the bank­
ruptcy Judge for content, and they may prove as nebulous as good 
faith." The reqmrement that court supervIsed reaffirmatIOn may be 
made only before discharge IS granted should have a salutary effect 
m preventmg blatant creditor pressure, but the standards for court 
gmdance are vague. The sectIon suffered much m the compromIses 
made by the Congress. 
IV DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE BANKRUPT 
After bankruptcy many have found that theIr fresh start has 
not been so fresh because bankruptcy often carnes with it a stIgma 
of Irresponsible behavIOr. Congress sought to alleVIate thIS stIgma 
somewhat by the new legIslatIon. The Bankruptcy CommIssIOn ver 
Sion of the antIdiscnmmatIon prOVISIOn would have outlawed any 
discnmmatory treatment of an mdividual because of mvolvement m 
a bankruptcy proceeding. 55 The enacted legIslatIon, BRA sectIon 
525, verbosely outlaws only governmental discnmmatIon m grants 
of pnvilege and employment. 
The House Report suggests that the difference between the 
prOVISIOn enacted and the CommISSIon proposal IS merely that the 
latter would have extended the prohibitIon to any discnmmatIon, 
even by pnvate partIes, whereas the enacted verSIOn applies only 
to governmental units. 56 In fact, the enacted verSIOn IS much nar­
rower than the House Report suggests. First, it applies to only two 
actIvitIes: denymg, revokmg or discnmmatmg m governmental 
grants of pnvilege, and denymg, termmatmg or discnmmatmg m 
employment. Furthermore, it IS forbIdden only when these actIVI­
tIes are done solely because of mvolvement m bankruptcy or fail­
ure to pay a discharged debt. 
54. The tenn 1S not defined, but commerc1al lawyers are familiar with the 
largely meanmgless "honest-m-fact" standard of U.C.C. § 1-201(19). 
55. H. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-508 (1975). The Comm1sslOn Bill went on to 
prov1de that other factors such present or prospective financ1al condition or mana­
genal ability could be cons1dered. Id. 
56. House Report, supra note 6, at 367, reprinted In [1978) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6322-23. 
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The House further mdicates that the sectIon codifies Perez v. 
Campbell. 57 That result, however IS largely codified elsewhere m 
the BRA. 58 The Perez decIsIOn held that a state could not employ its 
Motor VehICle Responsibility Law to coerce payment of a discharged 
debt, m that case, a Judgment ansmg out of a motor vehICle aCCI­
dent. The antIdiscnmmatIon sectIon obvIOusly exceeds Perez, but en­
compasses more than the holding III ways that are unclear It applies 
to demal of governmental pnvileges and employment where the 
demal IS solely due to mvolvement In a bankruptcy proceeding. 
The questIon follows, May bankruptcy Involvement be conSIdered 
at all? For example, May state bar exammers ask applicants ques­
tIons about pnor bankruptCIeS? May thIs have any relevance? The 
language of the CommISSIOn Bill would have answered these ques­
tIons negatIvely The legIslatIve hIstory of the BRA also tends to­
ward a negatIve answer 59 The literal language of the Act, how­
ever, seems to prohibit such conduct only where the conduct IS 
based completely on such Involvement. It IS unlikely that a com­
plamant would be able to show that the sole conSIderatIon m 
denymg a license and In termmatmg or refusmg employment was 
mvolvement m a bankruptcy proceeding. The legIslatIve hIstory of 
the antIdiscnmInatIon sectIon mdicates, however that the Intended 
thrust of the sectIon was to limit specific kmds of actIon by govern­
ment defendants, rather than to emphasIze the exclUSIvity of the 
57 402 u.S. 673 (1971). The thrust of the case IS that by requmng judgment 
debtor, m an action ansmg out of motor vehIcle aCCIdent to pay the judgment as 
condition for mamtammg valid dnver license, even though the judgment debt IS 
discharged m bankruptcy, the state frustrates the congressIOnal purpose and mter­
feres with the operation of the bankruptcy laws. Therefore, regardless of the laud­
able purpose of the state, such law offends the supremacy clause and IS constitu­
tionally mvalid. T the extent that it IS an act whICh operates to collect discharged 
debt, it IS enjomed by the BRA. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). T the 
extent that it IS reaffirmation of such debt, it would have to pass the prereqUIsite 
to validity posed by the BRA. [d. at § 524(c), see note 54 supra. 
58. T the extent that it operates to collect discharged debt, the discnmma­
tory activity IS enjomed by the BRA. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). In 
that it IS reaffirmation of such debt, it would have to pass the BRA stramer. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Supp. 1979). See text accompanymg note 54 supra. 
59. [P]rohibition extends only to discnmmation or other action based 
solely on the baSIS of the bankruptcy, on the baSIS of msolvency before or 
dunng bankruptcy pnor to determmation of discharge, or on the baSIS of 
nonpayment of debt discharged m the bankruptcy case (the Perez situa­
tion). It does not prohibit consIderation of other factors, such as future finan­
CIal responsibility or ability, and does not prohibit Imposition of reqUIre­
ments such as net capital rules, if applied mdiscnmmatorily 
House Report, supra note 6, at 366-67, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5963, 6321-23. 
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reason for the discnmmatIon. There IS a clear mvitatIon m the leg­
IslatIve hIstory for the courts to consIder the Issue broadly' "[T]he 
section IS not exhaustive. The enumeratIon of vanous forms of dis­
cnmmatIon agamst former bankrupts IS not mtended to permit 
other forms of discnmmatIon. "60 The wording of the sectlOn IS far 
from clear and its effectIveness IS very much m doubt. 
V CONSUMER CREDITORS 
Consumers may be creditors Just as any other entity may be a 
creditor, but mdividuais m pursuit of personal, family or household 
purposes may unwittmgly become creditors of a bankrupt m un­
conventional ways. These mdividuais may not even thmk of them­
selves as creditors. They are certamly not eqmpped by vIrtue of 
then creditor position to protect themselves by usmg the knowl­
edge tyPICal of a commercIal lender In limited areas, the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act has mcreased protectIon for these "consumer 
creditors. 
A troublesome problem mvolvmg consumer purchasers and 
lessees anses where the bankrupt IS a seller or lessor who has 
taken a down payment or security deposit on the purchase of con­
sumer goods or rental property 61 Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 
a trustee could disaffirm a contract for the sale of goods and reduce 
the purchaser to the status of an unsecured claImant for the 
amount paId towards the pnce. 62 ConsIder the heartrending hy­
pothetical of a poor couple who has struggled to make the 
down payment on a "layaway" of Chnstmas toys for the children, 
only to be depnved of the money and the toys upon bankruptcy of 
the toy store before the toys are completely paId for and delivered. 
It IS cold comfort for the poor couple to be told that they are now 
60. House Report, supra note 6, at 367, repnnted m [1978] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6323; S. REp No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978), repnnted 
m [1978] 5 V.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5867. 
61. The mterrelationshlp between bankruptcy and V.C.c. § 2-502 offered little 
help for the typIcal consumer purchaser, whatever the effectiveness of the V.C.C. 
section In other contests, and thIS has been matter of much dispute. Countryman, 
Buyers and Sellers of Goods m Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REV 1435 (1971); see Schrag & 
Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer· The Bankruptcy Law Has Nothmg to Of 
fer 72 COLUM. L. REv 1147, 1157 (1972). The buyer must show that (1) the debtor 
Insolvency occurred within ten days after the first Installment of thIS purchase was 
paId, and (2) that the goods had been Identified to the contract of sale. V.C.C. § 
2-502. 
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 V.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1979); see, e.g., 
In re Faber Inc., 360 F Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1973). Countryman, Executory Con­
tracts m Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv 439 (1973). 
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unsecured creditors of the toy store. They are unlikely to under 
stand how to pursue theIr claim havmg never thought of them­
selves as creditors at all. Nor are they likely to realize enough m a 
distributIon to unsecured creditors to purchase replacement toys. 
Such stones have moved many a law student to protest that thiS 
area of bankruptcy IS partIcularly harsh on the unsuspectmg public. 
Unfortunately although thiS situatIon probably occurs many tImes 
m real life, the amounts mvolved rarely lead to reported cases. 63 
The problem IS not limited to "layaway purchases, but m­
cludes many different situatIons, for example, prepaid appliance 
service repaIr contracts, prepaid contracts for other services such as 
dance lessons or exercise courses, and deposits made on merchan­
dise to be delivered subsequently 
Security deposits made by tenants to a lessor who subse­
quently becomes bankrupt IS a Similar situatIon. Here, fortunately 
the need for a remedy IS not so acute. 64 Some states have enacted 
legislatIon makmg these deposits a trust fund to whICh the lessor 
holds only legal title. 65 Trust property IS not part of the bankrupt's 
estate under the 1898 Act and the trustee receives only bare legal 
title under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 66 Moreover, under the 
63. See House Report, supra note 6, at 188, repnnted In [1978] 5 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6148-49. In testimony before the CongressIOnal 
Committee, witnesses used the much publiCIzed W T. Grant & Co. bankruptcy to 
illustrate the POInt. The more recent J. M. Fields Co. bankruptcy IS also on POInt. 
64. See generally 4A Collier, supra note 27, 11 70.44, at 539. 
65. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B(I)(e) (West 1977); N.Y. 
[GEN. OBLIG.} LAw § 7-103 (McKinney 1978). 
66. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1976) (repealed 1979). ThIS assumes that the debtor has 
complied with the law and segregated the trust funds. ThIS IS dubIOUS assumption 
In the case of failing lessor; all too frequently it IS suspected that the best the les­
see can hope for will be that the debtor has commmgled the funds with other gen­
eral busmess cash deposits. If so, the IntrICate rules of tracIng apply 
Whether the bankruptcy court will apply federal equity law or state law m 
resolvmg the difficult tracmg problems has not been .authoritatively settled. 4A Col­
lier, supra note 27 11 70.25 at 339. It has been suggested: 
State law, mcluding its common law, must generally determme whether 
trust relation eXIsted and whether the cestuI has suffiCIently Identified the 
trust property There IS no general federal law of trusts. But the prob­
lem does not end at thiS pomt. There IS the further question, and thiS fed­
eral one: What IS the distribution contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act In the 
situation at bar? State trust law must not be allowed to pervert or overrIde 
the distributive proVISIOns of the Bankruptcy Act. A state rule whICh pur­
ports to fasten general lien on person estate m the event of msolvency 
or general liqUIdation must be regarded as pnority m disgUIse and In­
compatible with the order of distribution prescribed for bankruptcy [The 
Bankruptcy Act} Intended to make clear that state rules of pnority of dis­
tribution must Yield m bankruptcy cases to that prescribed m the Act. 
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BRA, if the lessor s trustee rejects the lease, the lessee has the 
nght to mamtam posseSSiOn of the rental property agamst the trust­
ee, or treat rejectIon as termmatIon of the lease67 and offset rental 
and other amounts due the lessor at the hme of bankruptcy agamst 
the net amount of the security deposit. 68 These solutIons, however, 
fall far short of complete protectIon of tenants, because trust fund 
protectIOn IS available only where legIslatures have acted. Tenants 
may not Wish to mamtam posseSSiOn if servIces are termmated, 69 
Id., ~ 70.25, at 363-64, Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 937 (1968); lA. SCOTT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS, § 86.1, at 659 (3rd ed. 1967). 
67 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h) (West Supp. 1979). 
68. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
69. The BRA makes plam that tenant who chooses to remaIn In possessIOn for 
the balance of the term of the lease after the lessor trustee has rejected the lease 
may offset, agaInst the rent due, damages occurnng after rejection caused by nonper­
formance of obligations m the lease. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h) (West Supp. 1979). It must 
be remembered that lease IS both conveyance of real property and contract. As 
Professor Powell has expressed: 
In practice, the law today concernmg estates for years consists chiefly of 
rules determIning the construction and effect of lease covenants. Thus the 
background of lease as conveyance, built solidly by 1500, has tremen­
dous foreground, evolved largely since 1880, whICh IS purely contractual In 
character. The modem law IS the synthesIs of these two hlstoncal factors. 
Sometimes the background peeks through and controls. Sometimes the fore­
ground IS alone conSidered as determinative. The lawyer problem IS to de­
termine whICh of these two factors IS to control In hiS specific controversy 
2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, ~ 221[1], at 181 (1977). ThiS dual nature was recog­
mzed by the 1898 Act with the provISIon In § 70b whICh proVided that rejection 
of such lease or any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor does not depnve 
the lessee of hiS estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1l0(b) (1976) (repealed 1979). While thiS much 
was clear, little else was. See, e.g., Siegel, Landlord' Bankruptcy: A Proposal for 
Treatment of the Lease by Reference to Its Component Elements, 54 B.U.L. REv 
903 (1974). The proVISIOns permitting offset of damages for failure to perform land­
lord covenants of rejected lease clarify the area so far as the lessee IS concerned; it 
may be unfalf to the creditors and WIndfall to the tenant. As an illustration, assume 
that at the time of the lease the monthly rent IS set at $500 with $250 of that allo­
cated to the cost of prOVISIOns of services. At the time of the bankruptcy, the cost of 
servICes has Increased to $300, and so has the value of the occupancy of the prem­
Ises, for total of $600. If the lessee offsets the servICe substitute cost of $300, how­
ever, he will be obligated to pay only $200 net rent for hiS occupancy. While it may 
be argued that, In fact, thiS IS all the Interest the bankrupt lessor had, it hardly seems 
fair that the lessee should come out so much better than others dealing with the 
bankrupt. It would seem that thiS situation IS result of the congressIOnal drafts­
men failure to conSider the rather umque charactenstics of lease as not just an 
executory contract. The language of the BRA IS equally illustrative of thiS pOint. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 365(f)(2) (West Supp. 1979). If applied literally it will never allow the trus­
tee of lessor In liqUidation proceding to reject the lease SInce he must assume the 
lease In order to assign it. [d. ThiS works well enough In the usual executory con­
tract when performance will cease by both parties to the contract if rejected, but it IS 
not appropnate where the lessee may remain In posseSSIOn of the premises and must 
then continue to pay rent. The Bankruptcy CommiSSIOn eVidently conSidered thiS 
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and the offset offered under the BRA may be msufficIent. 
It seems that the BRA subsectIon 507(a)(5) offers substantIal 
help to consumers who become unwittmg unsecured creditors 
when the trustee disaffirms executory contracts mvolvmg the pur 
chase or lease of property or servlCes for personal, family or house­
hold use. The subsection gIves such creditors a fifth pnority for 
claIms up to a total amount of $900 resulting from retamed deposits 
for goods and servIces not delivered or provIded. Since the debtors 
mvolved are usually busmess bankrupts with assets, and smce the 
categones of unsecured creditors havmg greater pnority are lim­
ited,70 the fifth pnority consumer creditor has a sIgnificant chance 
of recovery Moreover, under BRA subsection 724(b)(2), tax liens 
are "postponed" until the first five pnority claImants are paId, and 
property subject to a tax lien IS used first to satIsfy these claIms to 
the extent of the amount of the tax lien. 71 
Similar problems mvolvmg real estate purchase contracts or 
other arrangements where the buyer does not receIve the property 
until the purchase pnce IS completely paid are not resolved by the 
fifth pnority for consumer deposits up to $900 because larger 
amounts of money are usually m Issue. The purchaser m these situ­
ations has merely an executory contract subject to rejectIon by the 
trustee. 72 
problem. It proVIded m its bill, that rejection of lease abandoned the leased prop­
erty to the lessee rather than causmg breach of the lease. H. 31, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 4-602(c) (1975). The CommIssIOn commented: 
[ThIS prOVISIon] obVIates the need to distingUIsh between leased 
covenants that are part of the estate of the lease and those that are not. As 
result, the court IS not mvited to reform the lease agreement entered by 
the parties. Instead the lessor trustee, or the debtor m posseSSIOn, IS called 
upon to compare the negative value of an unprofitable lease with the re­
mammg value of the leased property. If the outcome shows negative net 
value, he should abandon the leased property to the lessee. Abandonment IS 
not breach of the lease, however, and the lessee recelvmg the abandoned 
property IS not permitted claIm for loss of bargam. 
Comm. Report, supra note 3, § 4-602, at 157 n.12. 
70. Admmlstrative expenses have first pnority m distribution to unsecured 
creditors. The second pnority goes to claIms, surely of limited number, whICh anse 
after the commencement of the case m an mvoluntary bankruptcy, but before the ap­
pomtment of trustee. ThIrd and fourth pnorities are allowed for wage claIms of, 
and contributions to, employee benefit plans of the bankrupt. These are subject to 
substantial limitations. II U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(I)-(4) (West Supp. 1979). 
71. A SImilar concept was embodied m The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(c), 
whICh postponed" non-possessory tax liens 'on personal property to the claIms of 
first and second pnority creditors. II U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976) (repealed 1979). 
72. In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956) (applymg The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 70b); See 4A Collier, supra note 27, ~ 
70.43 n.16, at 522. 
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New provIsIOns of the BRA substantially paralleling those deal­
mg with leaseholds mitigate the harshness of the doctnne of rejec­
tion where the purchaser IS m possessIOn. 73 The purchaser may 
termmate hIs obligations and receIve a lien on the property m the 
amount of the purchase pnce already paId,74 or he may remam m 
posseSSIOn and contmue to make purchase payments, offsettmg 
damages caused after rejection by the debtor s nonperformance un­
der the contract. There IS no other liability on the estate for dam­
ages. The nght of offset IS the purchaser s only remedy 75 Upon 
completion of payments, the purchaser IS to receIve title from the 
trustee. These prOVISIons seem to enVISIon chapter proceedings but 
not liqmdatIon proceedings. In liqmdatIon the estate IS wound up 
and the seller-bankrupt's mterest m the property mcluding legal 
title, presumably will be sold. It IS not clear whether the buyer at 
thIS sale IS then subject to the control of the bankruptcy court or 
how a deed to the ongmal buyer could ultimately be executed. 76 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Consumers, whether as bankrupts or creditors of the bank­
rupt, while not receIvmg the proportionate conSIderation accorded 
owners or finanCIers of shoppmg centers77 m the Bankruptcy Re­
form Act, have at least receIved recognitIon for some of theIr spe­
CIal problems. As creditors, consumers mability to protect them­
selves m speCIal deposit situatIOns has been recogmzed. The $900 
limitation on recovery seems adequate to cover most small depos­
its, and the fifth pnority category of unsecured creditors offers rea­
sonable hope of substantial payment. The present claIms proce­
dure, however, IS far too cumbersome for the small amounts 
mvolved m consumer creditor litigation. The new bankruptcy rules 
should prOVIde for some sort of automatic recognitIon of these po­
tentIal claIms to mcrease the practical benefit of the new prOVISIons 
to most consumers. Consumers and other buyers of real estate 
through the use of contracts now have greater protectIon m event 
of the seller s bankruptcy Litigation will almost certamly be neces­
sary to clarify some areas. Similarly lessors of bankrupt landlords 
73. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West Supp. 1979). 
74. ld. § 365(j). ThIS same lien relief IS available for purchaser not III posses-
SlOn. 
75. ld. § 365(h). 
76. There are Similar, less complex, problems with lease holds when the lessor 
becomes bankrupt. See note 66 supra. 
77. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979). 
23 1979] BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
are accorded greater protections, although uncertamty still remams 
due to Congress lack of recognition of the legal complexities of 
leaseholds. 
While consumer bankrupts have not been gIVen the full mea­
sure of protection under the Bankruptcy Reform Act that the Bank­
ruptcy CommIsSIOn and some consumer advocates desIred, the 
"fresh start" prOVISIOns of the old Bankruptcy Act have been en­
hanced m a number of areas. In states with stmgy exemptIon laws, 
the BRA creates a federal floor on exemptIons. In those states, 
voluntary bankruptcy IS encouraged because federally exempt 
property otheTWlse subject to levy under state law would remaIn 
the debtor s upon bankruptcy It IS perhaps for thIS reason that 
the very peculiar prOVISIon permittmg states to elect not to use the 
federal exemptions was mserted. 78 The mcreased ability of the 
debtor to aVOId both consensual and nonconsensual liens on ex­
empt and abandoned property and redemptIon as of nght of prop­
erty subject to a security mterest should mcrease the usable prop­
erty left to the debtor after bankruptcy 
The direct economIC effect on consumer credit of these "fresh 
start" provlSlons, while mcalculable, IS probably not great. TheIr m­
direct effect IS a different questIon. As thIS artIcle has attempted to 
demonstrate, these prOVlSlons work mdirectly to discourage reaffir 
matIons of debts. The prOVISIOns of the Act dealing directly with 
reaffirmatIon are of uncertam utility although most extreme forms 
of abuse should be prevented. Much depends on how they are m­
terpreted by the courts. 
Most obscure m effect are the anttdiscnmmatton prOVISIOns. 
While these could be of substantIal SIgnificance, they may amount 
to nothmg at all, depending once agam on the courts application of 
the pnncIples. 
78. [d. § 522(b)(I). 
